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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
A Response to “Which 
Rights to enforce in Time 
of Public Emergency?”
A response to Cilem Şimşek
The interplay between human rights law (HRL) and 
international humanitarian law (IHL) is one of the most 
difficult and fascinating topics of international law. The blog 
by Cilem Şimşek  attempts to put in perspective the 
evolution of this interplay with a focus on the practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Three key themes are 
developed. Each of them gives rise to diverging 
interpretations as will be demonstrated by the following 
response.

1) The origins of the interplay between IHL and HRL.
While it seems obvious today that IHL and HRL overlap in 
armed conflict situations, this understanding is actually not 
so ancient and does not belong to a « traditional view ». It is 
submitted that when human rights law emerged at the 
international level with the United Nations Charter, they 
were seen as applying essentially in peacetime. No one had in 
mind armed conflict situations when the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. Traditionally, the 
prevailing view was that armed conflicts were governed by 
“the law of armed conflicts” while human rights law would be 
dealing with peacetime. When derogation clauses were 
included in human rights treaties, the assumption was that 
only non-derogable rights would remain in armed conflict 
situations. On the other hand, IHL was seen essentially as 
dealing with international armed conflicts, with the 
exception of common article 3 to the Geneva Convention 
(which contains obligations that are akin to the non-
derogable rights to be found in human rights treaties). The 
overlap was thus seen as minimal at the time. Meyrowitz 
provides a very good example of what was the main trend in 
the 1950s. It is only in the late 1960’s that this understanding 
evolved, notably due to the multiplication of non-
international armed conflicts in the Cold War context and 
the need for norms to cover such conflicts. The 1968 Teheran 
Conference marks a turning point in that regard. For the first 
time, the UN referred to “human rights in armed conflicts”. 
This led to an ever-expanding interpretation of the role of 
human rights law in armed conflicts by the UN and human 
rights bodies, as well as to the development of IHL for non-
international armed conflicts through the adoption of 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
2) The different approaches and the meaning of the lex 
specialis
The different approaches regarding the interplay between 
IHL and HRL have indeed often been described as divided 
between the separatist, complementarist and integrationist 
approaches. Interestingly enough, the author of the blog adds 
the “lex specialis position” of the ICJ as an additional 
approach. It is submitted though that the lex specialis maxim 
highlighted by the ICJ is not as such an additional approach 
to the interplay between IHL and HRL. Actually, depending 
on how the “lex specialis” maxim is understood, it might 
either fit into the separatist or the complementarist 
approach. Some – including States like the United States of 
America and Israel – have interpreted the lex specialis notion 
as meaning that, in armed conflict situations, IHL derogates 
from HRL as a whole. This interpretation has the effect of 
excluding – or at least severely diminishing – the relevance of 
human rights law in armed conflicts. To that extent, the lex 
specialis is used as one of the main legal rationale for 
maintaining a clear-cut separation between IHL and HRL 
(separatist theory). This interpretation is erroneous though 
and does not correspond to the ICJ understanding of the lex 
specialis. For instance, in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ clearly applied 
both IHL and HRL; thus demonstrating that the lex specialis 
does not result in mutual exclusiveness. At the level of legal 
regimes, IHL could only be a lex specialis in a somewhat 
improper sense in order to designate the fact that IHL is a 
body of law specifically dealing with armed conflicts which 
may thus complement the general protection offered by HRL. 
The lex specialis thus becomes a complementarity tool to 
coordinate the two levels of protection of HRL and of IHL. 
The practice of international bodies definitely goes in that 
direction, as demonstrated for instance by General Comment 
n° 31 of the Human Rights Committee in paragraph 11.
3) The approach taken by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)
The author of the blog holds that in cases dealing with armed 
conflict situations, the ECtHR addressed the interplay 
between IHL and HRL through the derogation mechanism to 
be found in article 15 of the European Convention. Actually, 
this never happened. There is a very simple reason for this. In 
those cases, States did not derogate.
In the Russian and Turkish cases, the Court did not apply IHL 
(at least explicitly). In the Isayeva case, the Court maintained 
that the operation at stake had “to be judged against a normal 
legal background” (§191). The prudence of the European 
Court vis-à-vis IHL in those cases is certainly due to the fact 
that Russia and Turkey did never recognize the existence of 
an armed conflict on their soil. Understandably, the Court 
thus took them at their word and decided to maintain the 
“normal background”-fiction in order to apply the more 
protective regime of HRL.
In more recent cases pertaining to recognized international 
armed conflicts, the Court did refer to IHL, but again, it did 
not do so through the derogation mechanism. For instance, in 
the Hassan case, the Court granted a decisive importance to 
IHL by considering that the internments performed by the 
UK in the context of the occupation in Iraq were not contrary 
to the European Convention despite the fact that 1) article 5 
of the European Convention does not allow for 
administrative detention even in armed conflicts and 2) that 
UK did not derogate from this article 5. Even if in actual facts 
the European Court gave somehow precedence to IHL, it did 
not present its finding as an application of the “lex specialis 
derogat legi generali” maxim, but rather as the result of an 
interpretive exercise giving due weight to the rules to be 
found in article 31§3 b) and c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. In particular, for the Court, State 
practice (which consists in not derogating from the ECHR to 
detain in accordance with IHL) modified article 5 of the 
ECHR (§101). The Court also highlighted that human rights 
obligations have to be interpreted “in harmony” with IHL 
(§102). States would therefore not be required to derogate 
from the ECHR in order to detain persons on the basis of the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions during international 
armed conflicts. The Court made clear though that this 
reasoning could only be applied in international armed 
conflicts. (§104).
In brief, the European Court has indeed increasingly taken 
into account IHL – not through derogations – but through 
interpretation in an attempt to coordinate or harmonize the 
two legal regimes. This is nothing more than a modern and 
enhanced version of the complementarist approach.
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